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Abstract – The paper presents thermal analysis and arc flash analysis taking care of protection relays coordination settings for electric 
motor drives connected to the electrical network. Power flow analysis is performed to check if there are any voltage and loading violation 
conditions in the system. Fault analysis is performed to check the short circuit values and compute arc flash energy dissipated at industrial 
busbars to eliminate damage to electrical equipment and electrical shocks and hazard to personnel. Computers enable the use of smart 
algorithms used by electrical engineers in providing accuracy of these actions. A fast and accurate procedure for proper incident arc flash 
energy computation and overcurrent relays coordination in distribution networks is presented. The paper presents the use of the Arc Flash 
module for arc flash energy computation during the short circuit on LV and HV busbars with soft motor starters. A sample case of one real 
network is presented which uses soft motor starters as well as the influence on arc flash energy in one transformer station supplying the 
industrial network in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Keywords – arc flash, distribution network, electric motor drive, power flow, protection, short circuit, thermal analysis 
1. INTRODUCTION
The paper presents computer modeling and arc 
flash hazard analysis of the distribution network with 
an industrial consumer with electric motor drives of 
one technological facility [1]. Protection coordina-
tion is essential in industrial facilities in order to avoid 
damage due to an arc flash produced by short circuit 
currents. Also, power flow analysis is very important 
to thermal analysis to check if some part of the system 
is overloaded [2]. An arc flash is dangerous because 
it produces the following effect: 80 % of all electri-
cal injuries are burns resulting from the electric arc 
flash. Section 2 deals with thermal analysis and power 
flow computations. Section 3 presents arc flow analy-
sis. Measures for reducing arc flash risk using proper 
protection coordination are presented in Section 4. 
The arc flash causes an explosion of electrical equip-
ment resulting in an arc plasma ball. Also, solid cop-
per vaporizes and expands to approximately 67,000 
times its original volume. The temperatures exceed 
12,000 Co and sound levels can reach up to 141.5 dB. 
In addition, the force can produce a pressure wave 
and light can be very bright including a plasma ball. 
The pressure of toxic smoke can be very dangerous 
[3]. Arc flash analysis and a hazard assessment are 
normed differently in the USA and the EU countries. In 
the USA, IEEE 1584-2002 entitled “IEEE Guide for Per-
forming Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations” is a standard. 
It provides a methodology for computing prospec-
tive arc flash hazards [4]. Based on the test data, the 
IEEE 1584 Committee developed empirical equations 
to calculate arc flash incident energy for AC systems. 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
has two parts, i.e. OSHA 1910.132 (d), and 1926.28 (a). 
According to the NFPA 70E industry standard [5], an 
employer is responsible for:
•	 Conducting a hazard assessment in the work-
place;
•	 Choosing and using the proper personal protec-
tive equipment; and 
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•	 Documenting the risk assessment.
OSHA considers arc flash assessments that follow the 
NFPA 70E standard. They have to be in line with OSHA 
requirements and protect workers from electrical safe-
ty hazards [6-7]. In the EU, the IEC standard does not 
pay special attention to arc flash energy calculation 
but it has a personal protection equipment (PPE) stan-
dard for arc flash protection equipment testing. The IEC 
61482-1 and the similar EN 61482-1 are split into two 
parts, which cover the methods for testing of clothing 
fabrics and garments designed to protect personnel 
against arc flash. 
IEC and identical EU standards, which have supersed-
ed ENV 50354, are now known as the “box test”. There 
are two test method versions: the “material box test”, 
which includes heat transfer measurements and ther-
mal curve differential analysis, and the “garment box 
test”, which requires only a visual assessment of gar-
ment performance [8].
The box-test standard defines two testing conditions, 
namely Class 1 and Class 2: 
•	 Class 1 tests at the arc current of 4 kA and arc du-
ration of 500 ms;
•	 Class 2 tests at the arc current of 7 kA and arc du-
ration of 500 ms.
A sample case considered in the paper are the in-
dustrial facilities supplied by the 10 kV overhead 
transmission line connected to the transformer sta-
tion TS 10/0.4 kV [9]. The modeled network consists 
of overhead distribution lines, a transformer station, 
molded-case circuit breakers, digital relays, cables 
and electric motors modeled in the software which 
can perform power flow, short circuit and arc flash 
modules.
Table 1. Motor data
Fig. 1. A single-line diagram of the electric motor drives connected to the TS [11]
2. THERMAL ANALYSIS OF AN ELECTRICAL 
NETWORK AND AN ELECTRIC MOTOR DRIVE  
Supply feeder rated voltage 10 kV is connected to 
TS Plješevac 10/0.4 kV transformer station. The length 
of line is 11.5 km and it is composed of Al/Fe 50 mm2 
conductors and some parts with older Al/Fe 25 mm2 
conductors. The feeder line of 10 kV is connected to TS 
110/35/10 kV Kiseljak supply transformer station. The 
main motor data are given in Table 1. 
Motor data Type Rated power Voltage PF
Function (kW) (V)
Mill 1 and Mill 2 AHR 200 380 0.85
Crusher 3 and 
Crusher 4 AHR 132 380 0.85
Colander AHR 132 380 0.85
Transport track AHR 132 380 0.85
Power flow analysis shows that there is no overload 
of any element in the network and the technological 
process which will be presented with computed results 
and thermal measurements and images. A summary 
report is shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Summary system report
Motor data Type Rated power Voltage PF
Generation in the 
system 750 209 779 0.963
Load in the system 687 154 704 0.976
Losses in the system 63 55
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With a thermal image of the medium voltage (MV) 
line pole in Fig 2, it is indicated that there are no over-
loaded elements on distribution conductors, isolators 
and connection elements. The working temperature 
of Al/Fe conductors is 65°C. The cables on the primary 
side can withstand a working temperature of 75°C and 
the transformer temperature for cooling IEC class for 
the ONAN transformer is 65-85°C.
Element overloads are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
Fig. 2. Thermal image of a 10 kV pole of the 
distribution line 














TS BUS3 BUS4 66.4 45.0 67.7% -32.3%
Table 3. Transformer loading report
Figures 3-5 clearly illustrate that there are no over-
loaded elements in the transformer station TS Plješevac 
and its components, busbars, fuses and isolators. Also, 
power flow computation shows that there are under-
loaded elements. All thermal images show that there is 
no heat radiation.
Fig. 4. Thermal image of an MV connection 
of the transformer 














L-2 170.0 44.9 26.4% -73.6%
L-1 125.0 45.0 36.0% -64.0%
C-3 585.0 225.2 38.5% -61.5%
C-5 585.0 225.2 38.5% -61.5%
C-6 585.0 279.9 47.9% -52.1%
C-1 675.0 341.3 50.6% -49.4%
B-2 1250.0 341.3 27.3% -72.7%
B-4 1250.0 225.2 18.0% -82.0%
B-5 1250.0 225.2 18.0% -82.0%
B-6 1250.0 279.9 22.4% -77.6%
Table 4. Line overload report
Load flow analysis shows that there are no overload-
ed elements, line and cables, their fuses or breakers in 
LV motor panels and switchboards. As illustrated in Ta-
ble 5, loss analysis indicates that losses are permissible; 
hence the elements are underloaded.
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From Bus To Bus Losses
Name Base (kV) Name
Base 
(kV) kW kVAr
BUS1 10.00 BUS2 10.00 36.3 23.4
BUS2 10.00 BUS3 10.00 21.4 7.3
BUS3 10.00 BUS4 0.400 4.2 23.9
BUS10 0.400 S7 0.400 0.2 0.1
BUS12 0.400 S9 0.400 0.2 0.1
BUS14 0.400 S11 0.400 0.3 0.2
S5 0.400 BUS8 0.400 0.4 0.2
S5 0.400 BUS4 0.400 0.2 0.0
S7 0.400 BUS4 0.400 0.2 0.0
S9 0.400 BUS4 0.400 0.2 0.0
S11 0.400 BUS4 0.400 0.2 0.0
Total 
Losses 63.8 55.2
Table 5. Branch losses report
It can also be seen that busbars are all within the 
permissible temperature limits, but only on one 200 
kW motor connection it can be seen that there is a 
higher temperature of 62.3°C and the warming pro-
cess on the contact at phase C, as can be seen in Fig.7. 
It could be a signal for the maintenance department 
to check this contact point. Cables from the substa-
tion supply electric motor drives owned by W&P Be-
ton Ltd Company, Sarajevo.
Fig. 6. Thermal image of LV busbars 
for a 200 kW motor
Fig. 7. Thermal image of LV main busbars
The temperature at LV busbars is good, as shown in 
Fig 7. Table 6 points to voltage drops, which are within 
permissible levels of +/- 10%.
From Bus To Bus Drop
Name Base (kV) Name Base (kV) %
BUS1 10.00 BUS2 10.00 5.3%
BUS2 10.00 BUS3 10.00 2.9%
BUS3 10.00 BUS4 0.40 -3.3%
BUS10 0.40 S7 0.40 -0.2%
BUS12 0.40 S9 0.40 -0.2%
BUS14 0.40 S11 0.40 -0.2%
S5 0.40 BUS8 0.40 0.2%
S5 0.40 BUS4 0.40 -0.0%
S7 0.40 BUS4 0.40 -0.0%
S9 0.40 BUS4 0.40 -0.0%
S11 0.40 BUS4 0.40 -0.0%
Table 6. Voltage drop report
3. ARC FLASH ANALYSIS
The Software Arc Flash module enables computation 
of incident energy on busbars during the three-phase 
bolted short circuit faults [5]. Arc flash hazards can re-
sult from many factors, e.g. dropped tools, accidental 
contact with electrical parts, corrosion and improper 
work procedures. An arc is produced by the flow of 
electrical current through ionized air after an initial 
flashover or short circuit, resulting in a flash that can 
cause significant heating and burn injuries to occur. 
Hazard effects of arch flash can be very harmful and 
dangerous for personnel.
Fig. 8. Accidents involving arc flash [7]
An arc flash hazard assessment is useful for those 
places where workers are exposed to arc flash during 
their work. So it may not be necessary to perform a risk 
assessment for every part of equipment in the network. 
All switchboards in which LV breakers, fuses and reclos-
ers are installed had to be included in the assessment if 
there is a possibility that an arc flash injury might occur. 
Incidents may occur when operating breakers or fused 
disconnects, even with the door closed. 
The first action is arc prevention and it includes the 
following: de-energize equipment if at all possible, la-
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bel equipment and train personnel, minimize risk with 
good safety practices, move people further away, de-
sign the hazard out (Safety by Design), reduce available 
fault current, and faster clearing times. What is impor-
tant to realize is that the level of fault current changes 
clearing times of all protective relays. These changes 
can have a significant impact on the arc flash hazard 
and the Personal Protection Equipment requirements 
(PPE) for each part of equipment.
Fig. 9. Using protection equipment when working 
with voltage [10]
Working distance is a very important part of an arc 
flash hazard assessment. The arc flash boundary and 
associated protection requirements are based on the 
incident energy levels available to the person’s chest or 
face. The hands or arms are not included. A degree of 
injury depends on the percentage of person’s burned 
skin since the head and chest areas are more critical 
to survival than fingers or arms. During live working, 
the hand and head regions are particularly at risk of 
being burnt by arc faults. National regulations valid in 
the country of use must be observed. Employers must 
provide tested personal protective equipment (PPE) in 
compliance with Directive 89/686/EEC to their employ-
ees. PPE must be certified by an accredited test insti-
tute. Employers must ensure that PPE is used properly.
Fig. 10. Software module for Arc Flash [11]
Software enables analysis including multiple graphi-
cal tools to solve overcurrent relay coordination prob-
lems to reduce arc flash effects. The program enables 
up to five working distances for each voltage level. 
The user can use a safety program where distances 
can be modified for a specific operation and mainte-
nance function. This also allows easy standardization 
of personal protecting equipment and clothing levels 
for safety benefits. For higher voltage levels, greater 
distances may be used to indicate hot stick operations.
Determination of the arc energy is given by the equation:
where:
Warc - electrical arc energy (expected value)
kp  - arc power in relation to the short-circuit power
Un - nominal voltage
I“k3p  - three-phase fault current
tk - tripping time of the overcurrent relay
The amount of energy impressed on a surface at a 
specific distance away from the source during an elec-
trical arc event is defined as incident energy. Incident 
energy is measured in joules per centimeter squared (J/
cm2) or in calories per centimeter squared (cal/cm2). 
Software provides a threshold incident energy level for 
different voltage ranges. If the incident energy level of 
a particular device is above the threshold, the device 
will be highlighted on the one-line as immediate dan-
ger. Electrical workers and safety managers can use this 
threshold to immediately identify areas where current 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) standards will not 
provide the required safety margins. Traditional infra-
red thermograph survey inspection that can be used 
for preventive checking using infrared windows and 
viewports for visual inspection in regular scheduled 
maintenance intervals is shown in Fig. 11.
Fig. 11. Infrared visual  
thermography inspection [10]
The selection and overcurrent coordination of the sys-
tem protective relays are very important. Each protective 
device needs to be determined by plotting the device TCC 
(Time-Current-Curves) operating characteristic for a given 
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feeder supply. Adequate separation of protective relays 
depends on the type of device and the desired safety fac-
tor. At the beginning of a 0.4 kV feeder there is a second-
ary overcurrent relay Energoinvest. At the primary side of 
the distribution transformer is an MV fuse. Protection re-
lays used to protect the secondary side of the transformer 
in TS Plješevac is an LV breaker with the LSI characteristic. 
On the cables, there are fuses and LV breakers with LSI 
characteristics and relays for electric motor soft start. Pro-
tection input data for relay presetting from the Distribu-
tion System Operator (DSO) Company and the W&P Beton 
Ltd Company are given in Table 7.
Relay
Protection relay settings
Type of relay Function Setting Setting









FS0 HV Fuse 63 A IEC standard








F1, F2 LV Fuses 500A IEC standard
F3 LV Fuse 400A 
B1-B2 SIEMENS LV breakers LSI I>400 A
I>>2400 A, 
LT band B 
StT delay A
I>>> 4800 A
B3 SIEMENS LV breaker LSI I>300 A
I>>1600 A, 
LT band B 
StT delay B
I>>> 3200 A
Table 7. Protection relay settings
Overcurrent coordination for a three-phase fault at 
bus 11 for a 200 kW motor is shown in Fig. 12. From the 
TCC curves shown in Fig. 12 it can be concluded that 
protection relay coordination is well performed. In the 
case of three-phase faults, motor LV breaker B3 will trip 
first. If it fails to trip, then the LV fuse will trip. The last to 
be activated is breaker B0 on the LV secondary side of 
the transformer.
All motors at LV busbars with rated power 200 kW and 
M3 132 kW are equipped with a soft starter adjustable 
frequency device to adjust starting of the motor. In this 
case, the soft starter manufactured by Allen-Bradley is 
used, and its soft start curve is presented in Fig. 13. [8]
Fig. 12. Protection coordination for a 3-phase fault 
at bus 8 for a 200 kW soft start motor [11]
Fig. 13. Soft start curve of the 
SMC Flex adjustable controller
Arc flash hazard analysis is performed in the short cir-
cuit focus. The analysis yields results as required by NFPA-
70E. NFPA requires a specification of the arc flash bound-
ary and the incident arc energy at a probable working 
distance. Various analysis options are available such as 
the type of the calculation method, working distances, 
units, the type of enclosure for equipment, and the use 
of arcing time. Results may be viewed on the one-line 
as well as in spreadsheet reports. The arc flash report is 
an interactive spreadsheet, in which users can change 
some values and the results will change automatically. 
Work permits for working on energized equipment 
recommending the appropriate PPE based on arc flash 
hazard analysis and the nature of work can be created. 
The IEEE 1584 equations are applicable up to 15kV. 
Above 15 kV, the program uses the Ralph Lee method 
and the distance X factor and the gap from the library 
do not apply. This method has the distance exponent of 
2. Software obtains “Worst-Case Arc Flash Hazards”, the 
arcing time from the upstream protective device of the 
faulted bus. Some circuit breakers have an additional 
instantaneous trip setting that can be turned on during 
maintenance work. In the case of faults, this results in 
fast tripping, limiting the arc flash incident energy.
During normal operation, this trip is set to “Off” for se-
lective coordination. This additional trip may be known 
as Maintenance Mode or have commercial names such 
as ARMS, Quick-Trip, or RELT. As specified in Short Circuit 
Options, when 100% of calculated arc current or the up-
per value yields greater arc flash incident energy, then 
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the text results are displayed in black in the Arc Flash Re-
port spreadsheet. When 85% or the lower value yields 
greater incident energy, the texts are displayed in pink. 
When short circuit analysis is performed for all buses, 
we get results for incident arc flash energy for all buses. 
It is very high in the main 0.4 kV busbar, and at all mo-
tor panel busbars, incident energy is over permissible 
levels and marked red. Arc flash hazard reports are gen-
erated in the form of a spreadsheet. Fig. 14. shows a re-
port for a faulting “BUS-4”. 
Fig. 14. Arc flash incident energy is over permissible limits on the main 0.4 kV and motor busbars. [11]
From Fig. 14 it can be seen that incident arc flash energy is over limited values and can be dangerous for person-
nel working at the main HV and LV transformer busbars BUS3 and BUS4, all motor panel busbars S5 to S11 and 




















































BUS2 10 REL2 51/50 IEC 153 0.763 0.774 0.5 0.54 323.6 457.2 0.9 #1
BUS3 10 REL2 51/50 IEC 153 0.516 0.526 12.76 12.8 5,457 457.2 13.4 #3
BUS4 0.4 B0 LSI 32 9,248 4,46 11,117 11,117 12,098.3 457.2 149.5 Ext Danger
BUS8 0.4 B1 LSI 32 8,726 4,26 0.084 0.084 424.2 457.2 1.1 #1
BUS9 0.4 B2 LSI 32 8,726 4,26 0.084 0.084 424.2 457.2 1.1 #1
BUS10 0.4 B3 LSI 32 8,654 4,98 0.3 0.3 1,129.1 457.2 4.5 #2
BUS11 0.4 B4 LSI 32 8,654 4,98 0.3 0.3 1,129.1 457.2 4.5 #2
BUS12 0.4 B5 LSI 32 8,654 4,98 0.3 0.3 1,129.1 457.2 4.5 #2
BUS13 0.4 B6 LSI 32 8,654 4,98 0.3 0.3 1,129.1 457.2 4.5 #2
BUS14 0.4 B7 LSI 32 8,654 4,98 0.3 0.3 1,129.1 457.2 4.5 #2
S5 0.4 F1 Fuse 32 9,182 4,435 0.625 0.625 1,706.7 457.2 8.4 #3
S6 0.4 F2 Fuse 32 9,182 4,435 1,271 1,271 2,763.2 457.2 17 #3
S7 0.4 F3 Fuse 32 9,182 4,435 0.625 0.625 1,706.7 457.2 8.4 #3
S8 0.4 F4 Fuse 32 9,182 4,435 0.625 0.625 1,706.7 457.2 8.4 #3
S9 0.4 F5 Fuse 32 9,182 4,435 0.625 0.625 1,706.7 457.2 8.4 #3
S10 0.4 F6 Fuse 32 9,182 4,435 0.625 0.625 1,706.7 457.2 8.4 #3
S11 0.4 F7 Fuse 32 9,182 4,435 0.625 0.625 1,706.7 457.2 8.4 #3
Table 8. Arc flash report
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In Table 8, it can be seen that without eliminating 
arch flash hazard we will have extremely dangerous 
requirements for PPE clothing and a high amount of in-
cident arch flash energy which can cause a serious risk 
to personnel security and health.
4. ELIMINATING ARC FLASH HAZARD RISK
It is necessary to eliminate such huge level of risk 
while working on busbar BUS4 and busbars S5 to S11, 
so it is necessary to rearrange upstream relay settings 
of breaker B0 to new lower and faster time settings. The 
TCC time-current (t-I) characteristics for that case are 
presented in Fig. 16. For the existing systems, reduc-
ing the duration of an arc is the most practical method 
to reduce incident energy. Arc duration is a function 
of time-current characteristics of the upstream device 
that must clear the fault. The arcing time can get re-
duced in several ways. Some changes in the system of 
settings may be required for this purpose. Some strate-
gies outlined in this section are as follows:
•	 Perform or update a protective device coordination 
study to reduce protective device operating times.
•	 Implement maintenance mode settings for low 
voltage breakers and protective relays.
•	 Implement Zone Selective Interlocking for a low 
voltage switchgear.
•	 Implement “Fast Bus Tripping” schemes for a me-
dium voltage switchgear.
•	 Use bus and transformer differential protection to 
combine selectivity with instantaneous operation.
•	 Retrofit time-overcurrent relays with a delayed in-
stantaneous trip (definite-time) element if needed.
•	 Use optical sensors to rapidly clear faults in the 
event of arc flash within an equipment enclosure.
•	 Install remote feeder breakers to reduce arc flash 
levels for group mounted low voltage switch-
boards and panel boards.
In this paper, the first strategy is used to update a pro-
tective device coordination study to reduce protective 
device operating times. There are limited options for re-
ducing current significantly, especially on the existing sys-
tems. The main tool available for reducing arc flash energy 
is to reduce the arc time. When coordinating inverse time 
type relays such as overcurrent relays, circuit breakers and 
fuses, selectivity is achieved by making each upstream de-
vice slower than all downstream relays it must coordinate 
with. While this slower operation may provide adequate 
equipment protection, it results in longer arc times and 
higher arc energy. Protective device coordination is gen-
erally a compromise between protection (fast operation) 
and selectivity (slower operation), and these two goals are 
quite often directly conflicting. In the past, coordination 
settings were based on equipment protection boundar-
ies and arc flash levels were not considered. 
Significant reduction in incident energy is often pos-
sible without sacrificing coordination by simply lowering 
device settings. To ensure that overcurrent relays in series 
properly coordinate with each other, it is often necessary 
to allow a safety margin between the two time-current 
curves. This is especially true for overcurrent relays and 
medium voltage circuit breakers. This safety factor is re-
ferred to as the Coordination Time Interval or CTI. Tradi-
tionally, when coordinating between two overcurrent 
relays, a CTI of 0.3 to 0.4s was used. This was based on the 
accuracy and operating characteristics of electromechan-
ical induction disk overcurrent relays. With modern digital 
relays, this CTI can be reduced to range between 0.2 and 
0.25s. This reduction can significantly reduce the incident 
energy levels.
Fig. 15. Protection coordination for a three-phase fault 
at bus 8 for a 200 kW motor with a soft starter [11]
After arc flash analysis, we can see in the last column 
in Table 9 that in this case the required clothing classes 












FS0 HV Fuse 63 A IEC standard
B4 SIEMENS LV breaker






F1-7 LV Fuse 400A IEC standard
B1-B2 SIEMENS LV breakers
LSI, I>400 A, LT 
band B
I>>1,800 A, 
StT delay A I>>>2,520 A
B3-B7 SIEMENS LV breaker
LSI, I>300 A, LT 
band A
I>>1,600 A, 
StT delay A I>>>2,400 A
Table 9. Final relay settings
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Fig. 15. Arc flash reduction using correct relay settings. [11]
Table 10 presents the final result after rearranging relay settings.










































BUS2 10 REL2 51/50 153 0.763 0.774 0.05 0.09 51.3 457.2 0.1 #1
BUS3 10 REL2 51/50 153 0.516 0.526 6.056 6.096 2,545.8 457.2 6.4 #2
BUS4 0.4 B0 LSI 32 9.248 5.248 0.06 0.06 393.5 457.2 1 #1
BUS8 0.4 B1 LSI 32 8.726 5.013 0.04 0.04 288.9 457.2 0.6 #1
BUS9 0.4 B0 LSI 32 8.726 5.013 0.06 0.06 380.5 457.2 0.9 #1
BUS10 0.4 B0 LSI 32 8.654 4.98 0.06 0.06 378.6 457.2 0.9 #1
BUS11 0.4 B0 LSI 32 8.654 4.98 0.06 0.06 378.6 457.2 0.9 #1
BUS12 0.4 B0 LSI 32 8.654 4.98 0.06 0.06 378.6 457.2 0.9 #1
BUS13 0.4 B0 LSI 32 8.654 4.98 0.06 0.06 378.6 457.2 0.9 #1
BUS14 0.4 B0 LSI 32 8.654 4.98 0.06 0.06 378.6 457.2 0.9 #1
S5 0.4 F1 IEC 32 9.182 5.218 0.06 0.06 391.8 457.2 1 #1
S6 0.4 F2 IEC 32 9.182 5.218 0.06 0.06 391.8 457.2 1 #1
S7 0.4 F3 IEC 32 9.182 5.218 0.06 0.06 391.8 457.2 1 #1
S8 0.4 F4 IEC 32 9.182 5.218 0.06 0.06 391.8 457.2 1 #1
S9 0.4 F5 IEC 32 9.182 5.218 0.06 0.06 391.8 457.2 1 #1
S10 0.4 F6 IEC 32 9.182 5.218 0.06 0.06 391.8 457.2 1 #1
S11 0.4 F7 IEC 32 9.182 5.218 0.06 0.06 391.8 457.2 1 #1
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After arc flash analysis, in the last column in Table 11 
it can be seen that in this case the required clothing 
classes are #1 and #2.



















ergy Rating of 
PPE (cal/cm2)
0 Untreated  Cotton (1) 4.7-7 1.2
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In this paper, thermal analysis using an infrared 
thermal camera and computer power flow analysis 
is presented to confirm the presence of any element 
overload in the distribution system and an industrial 
company. In addition, Arc Flash analysis is introduced 
followed by a hazard assessment and it is explained 
how to use a computer program for calculating inci-
dent energy; working distance and personal protective 
equipment can be chosen to mitigate arch flash effects. 
Protection coordination of numerical relays, LV break-
ers and fuses is very important and it is one of the ways 
to mitigate and reduce the risk of arc flash. A sample 
case was presented where presetting values of time 
current curves were not chosen and coordinated well 
so that it caused a high level of incident energy. After 
rearranging TCC presented in Fig. 15, incident energy 
was reduced and the risk of arc flash is mitigated.
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